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Unbuilding from the Inside: Leadership and Democratisation in South Africa and 
South Korea 
 
Leaders have an important role in initiating and shaping the democratisation process. Formal 
and informal structures within the political system constrain possible options requiring leaders 
to exercise agency to manage expectations and facilitate change. This paper examines the 
actions of F.W. de Klerk (South Africa) and Roh Tae Woo (South Korea) in initiating 
processes that eventually led to the consolidation of democratic political systems. The aims of 
the paper are to: (1) identify the array of opportunities and threats faced by the two leaders; 
and (2) determine the effect of regime form in shaping these structural factors. Drawing on 
previous work on the role of leadership in democratisation, the analysis focuses on four 
factors: authority, institutions, opposition and continuity. To assess decisions made in the 
distinct political contexts the paper examines how the respective structural configuration 
(one-party and military) was managed.  
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Introduction 
Individual leaders play an important role in initiating and directing the democratisation 
process, with their actions shaping the ensuing regime (O’Brien, 2007; O’Brien, 2010). 
Recent events during the Arab Spring and the colour revolutions have raised questions 
regarding the importance of popular protest in bringing about change (Bunce and Wolchik, 
2011; Springborg, 2011; Volpi, 2013). In each case the results have been mixed, as some 
states initiated democratic regime change (Serbia, Tunisia and Ukraine), some have failed to 
lead to changes in the political system (Armenia, Belarus and Morocco), while others have 
reverted to non-democracy after initial gains (Egypt and Kyrgyzstan) (Bunce and Wolchik, 
2011; Volpi, 2013). Although popular protests were significant in raising challenges to the 
incumbent regimes in these cases, the actions of regime elites arguably played the decisive 
role in determining the form of regime transition that results. Where regime elites attempt to 
maintain control in the face of widespread social instability and opposition the result may be 
more damaging with longer-lasting implications for the regime that emerges. These 
developments point to the need to more closely consider decisions taken by leaders of non-
democratic regimes when faced with pressure to reform and the impact this has on the 
likelihood of democratisation. 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Cambridge University Press in 
Government & Opposition on 26 January 2016, available online: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2015.41  
 
2 
 
 
The decision of regime elites to initiate a process that will lead to regime change and 
potentially democratisation is a difficult one, likely involving the loss of influence and power. 
It is therefore important to examine the factors that can support or hinder steps towards 
democratisation. Drawing on the concept of political opportunity structure (see Tilly, 2008: 
90-2), this paper develops a framework to identify the range of opportunities and constraints 
that such leaders face. The concept of opportunity structures captures the idea that individual 
leaders possess agency, which they exercise within the bounds of the formal and informal 
structures that govern politics and society (see Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013). With this 
in mind the paper examines the configuration of four broad categories of structure that face 
leaders in the transitional period: authority, institutions, opposition, and continuity. These 
structures can be seen as central in defining the environment within which the leader 
operates, changes in their configuration over time shaping the scope and exercise of 
individual agency. 
 
To develop this approach in the understanding of leadership decision-making, the paper 
examines the cases of South Africa under F.W. de Klerk and South Korea under Roh Tae 
Woo. Both de Klerk and Roh came to power following hard-line leaders who had maintained 
the non-democratic character of the respective regimes and each chose to reform the system 
rather than perpetuate the regime they had inherited.
1
 Although they faced significant protests 
calling for change from within society their positions were relatively secure, as the repressive 
apparatus would have allowed continuation of existing practices for a period of time.
2
 By 
deciding to initiate regime liberalisation, they were likely to face strong opposition from 
regime insiders and institutions that had developed to support the non-democratic system. 
The decision to liberalise the respective regimes can therefore be seen as an attempt to 
establish new bases of legitimacy to enable the regime to continue to maintain control. 
 
Comparing the actions of de Klerk and Roh also provides an opportunity to consider how 
different non-democratic regime types shape the ability of an individual leader to initiate 
reform and move towards democracy. Although military and one-party regimes rely on the 
                                                          
1
 In the case of South Africa, P.W. Botha had introduced some liberalising reforms, but these did not challenge 
the guiding principles of the regime (Giliomee, 2013).  
2
 Guo and Stradiotto (2014: 25) classify the mode of transition in both countries as cooperative where 
‘democratization is the result of joint action by government and opposition groups.' 
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corporate institutions to govern, their form and implications vary substantially. Military 
regimes are bound by hierarchical structures and tend to focus on establishing order in the 
face of uncertainty. These hierarchical structures will guarantee the leader control provided 
the military as institution is not threatened. One-party regimes by contrast have a strong 
incentive to remain in power, as the decision to relinquish control will mean less of influence 
and open participants to retribution for past actions. In such cases the incentive is for the 
leader to ensure perpetuation of the party institution in power. Examining democratisation 
from military (South Korea) and one-party (South Africa) regime types allows for 
consideration of how the structural features identified shape the agency of individual leaders 
in different political contexts. 
 
This paper focuses on the decision of de Klerk and Roh to initiate change and move towards 
democracy. The aims of the paper are to: (1) identify the array of opportunities and threats 
faced by the two leaders; and (2) determine the effect of regime form in shaping these 
structural factors. The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. The first section 
examines the nature of democratisation and the factors that can support or hinder moves 
towards a fully democratic political system. In the second section the core features of one 
party and military regime types are outlined, identifying the role of the individual leader in 
shaping the direction of these regimes. In the third section, a framework of opportunities and 
threats is developed setting out the factors that constrain or enable the leader to act, 
considering differences between one party and military regime types. This section will also 
examine key literature on political leadership to locate the role of the leader. Section four 
considers the actions of de Klerk and Roh using the framework, focusing on identifying the 
relative strength of threats and opportunities. Finally, the paper draws on the case studies to 
revisit the framework to determine the utility of examining transitional leadership and the 
possibilities for application to other cases. 
 
Perspectives on Democratisation 
The democratisation process ideally involves a shift from a non-democratic political system 
to a stable functioning democracy. Although the process in a particular case may appear to be 
relatively straightforward looking back, actors involved are required to make decisions in 
situations of great uncertainty as the rules of the game are redefined (Haggard and Kaufman, 
1997). Democratisation is not a linear process, as the actors involved seek to find their 
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position within the changing context, meaning that progress can stall, go backwards or 
consolidate in some new form of non-democratic regime (McFaul, 2002; O’Donnell, 1996). 
In a seminal work on the process, Rustow (1970, 353) argued that often ‘Democracy was not 
the original or primary aim; it was sought as a means to some other end or it came as a 
fortuitous by-product of the struggle.’ As a result, when considering the democratisation 
process it is important to consider the motivations and interests of those guiding or attempting 
to block the process.  
 
The democratisation process entails a reformulation of existing practices and behaviours. The 
degree of upheaval will be significant, raising questions about the relative significance of 
structural and agential factors (Giddens, 1995). Structural factors, such as economic 
development, social fractionalisation, religious cleavages and political culture have been 
advanced as playing a role in determining whether a country will democratise (see Teorell, 
2010: 17-18). Alongside structural factors, the individual agency of elite actors also plays a 
role in determining the character of the democratisation process. Considering archetypal case 
of democratisation in Spain, Linz and Stepan (1996: 92) argue ‘No one can ignore the 
structurally favourable conditions in Spain, but there can be no doubt that this particularly 
successful transition owes much to agency.’ In this sense, structural conditions arguably play 
a supporting role, providing the bounds within which actions are taken, as decisions on 
resistance or acquiescence to pressures on the incumbent regime rest with the regime elites. 
Examining regime persistence and change in Latin America, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 
(2013: 14) argue that elite policy preferences (moderate or radical), normative preference for 
democracy or authoritarianism and the regional political environment determine the chance 
of democratisation. Structural factors will exert pressure on the regime, but ultimately it is 
elites within the regime that determine how best to manage these opportunities and threats. 
 
Within the democratisation process it is possible to distinguish stages that lead to the 
emergence of a successful democratic political system. There are generally three broad stages 
identified, decay or liberalisation of non-democratic rule, transition, consolidation of the new 
political order (see: Haggard and Kauffman, 1995; Linz and Stepan, 1996; O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, 1986). Although it has been argued that these stages are not guaranteed (see 
McFaul, 2002), they do provide a broad framework within which such transitions can be 
understood. At each stage elite actors within the regime and externally are required to make 
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decisions about what would best suit the interests of the regime, for example liberalisation by 
the regime does not necessarily mean that a democratic outcome will result. In an 
examination of pressures on authoritarian regimes, Levitsky and Way (2010) argue that the 
degree of linkage to the West increased the likelihood of democratisation. Differences in 
internal regime dynamics were less significant, suggesting that non-democratic regimes can 
persist regardless of their administrative capacity. Considering the Tiananmen Square 
massacre in China in 1989, Deng (2011) argues that the limited opening allowed by the 
regime was closed after its continuity was threatened by the spread of protest to the broader 
community. Pressure from international actors had little effect once the regime had decided 
on the course of action. In assessing the nature of democratisation it is therefore important to 
consider the array of internal and external structural constraints bearing on the actors 
involved. 
 
Initiation of a liberalisation stage can result from a range of different sources, but a key 
underlying driver is a loss or challenge to the legitimacy of the regime. Attempts to regain 
legitimacy or identify a new basis for support can provide an opening for opposition to 
emerge (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Opposition can take the form of divisions within the regime 
and from external actors. Considering the balance of powers within a regime, O’Donnell and 
Schmitter (1986) pointed to the importance of hard-liners seeking continuity and soft-liners 
favouring some form of liberalisation. Where such divisions exist, the relative strength of 
each will shape the direction the regime will take in establishing its legitimacy. External 
pressures on the regime can reinforce internal tensions, by providing support or justification 
for the decisions made. Recent regime changes associated with the colour revolutions and the 
Arab Spring have demonstrated the significance of mass mobilisation in forcing change (see 
Bunce and Wolchik, 2011; Tripp, 2013; della Porta, 2014). However, as Tarrow (1995: 205) 
has argued ‘while the mass public rumbles in the wings; the actors on the stage are the elites’, 
suggesting that internal dynamics predominate during the liberalisation stage. The action of 
the regime to liberalise and move towards democracy or otherwise ultimately rests with the 
elites in power. 
  
The shift to the transition stage is clearly governed by the internal regime dynamics at play as 
the incumbent elites seek to manage the challenges associated with liberalisation. At this 
point the move to democracy is not wholly determined, as the regime has the option to 
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maintain a status quo stand-off, to revert to repressive measures in an attempt to suppress 
challengers, or to reform the system avoiding full democratisation. A move towards 
democratisation involves a decision by the political leadership to “institutionalise some 
crucial aspect of the democratic procedure.” (Rustow, 1970: 355) The mechanisms by which 
this shift is made will be determined by the context, leading Linz and Stepan (1996: 71) to 
argue that: 
Transitions initiated by [external actors]…tend toward situations in which the instruments of 
rule will be assumed by an interim or provisional government. Transitions initiated by 
hierarchical state-led or regime-led forces do not. 
The ability of the incumbent regime actors to maintain control over the transition process can 
generate stability and some degree of certainty. In cases where the process is initiated by the 
regime and the competing forces are relatively evenly balanced a negotiated solution may be 
possible (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). In situations where either the incumbent elite or 
the opposing forces are clearly dominant the result will be a dictated or abdicated transition 
(Brooker, 2000), creating grievances among the losers.  
 
The regime is consolidated when the actors involved accept the new reality and work within 
the (democratic) rules. Consolidation is the outcome of the democratisation process, 
involving ‘reform of state institutions, the regularization of elections, the strengthening of 
civil society.’ (Carothers, 2002: 7) The importance of the consolidation phase is derived from 
recognition of ‘the constraints that socio-economic structures and political institutions place 
upon the kinds of choices that political actors make.’ (Encarnación, 2000: 486) The complex 
character of the consolidation requires a close examination of the component parts, rather 
than seeking to pinpoint the moment at which it can be considered consolidated. The nature 
of the emerging regime will also be shaped by the character of the preceding non-democratic 
regime and the legacy it leaves (Hite and Morlino, 2004). In order to understand the role of 
elite actors in shaping the democratisation process it is therefore necessary to consider the 
regime type and the form of associated leadership. 
 
Characteristics of One-Party and Military Regimes 
Non-democratic regimes vary significantly in their ideological motivation and form, with the 
common characteristic being the acquisition of ‘power by means other than competitive 
elections.’ (Gandhi, 2008: 7) Within the broader categorisation of non-democratic regime, 
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there are three institutional forms: military, one-party, and personalist (including 
monarchical) (Brooker, 2000; Gandhi, 2008). This paper focuses on military and one-party 
regimes for two reasons. First, these regime types have a corporate institution (armed forces 
and party) that is potentially able to persist following a change in regime towards democracy. 
Secondly, the presence of such a corporate institution insulates the leader to a certain extent, 
providing the opportunity for reintegration into the post-transition political system, depending 
on the degree of control they are able to exercise over the transition. By contrast, personalist 
rulers are much less able to survive regime change, due to their more complete identification 
with the character of the non-democratic regime (Brooker, 2000). The possibility of 
redemption or at least reduced chance of prosecution following the end of a period of non-
democratic rule therefore provides an opportunity for leaders of military and party regimes to 
consider democratisation as an option. Despite these similarities, the incentives for each 
differ based on the institutional form that underpins their control of the system. 
 
In order to understand the ability of leaders to exercise influence it is necessary to examine 
the key characteristics of military and one-party regimes. The defining feature of the military 
regime is ‘that the armed forces are the institution through which rulers govern.’ (Gandhi, 
2008: 25) This means that military leaders are able to use the hierarchical structures 
embedded within the armed forces to exercise control (Frantz and Stein, 2012). This 
necessarily results in the exclusion or subordination of non-military actors from political life. 
Although the military is structured along hierarchical lines, engagement in politics will 
require the emergent leader to neutralise internal threats and get the support of colleagues to 
ensure the security of the ruling elite (Gandhi, 2008). Croissant and Kamerling (2013) argue 
with reference to Myanmar that this can be achieved through the introduction of limited 
liberalisation as a means of institutionalising power-sharing to ensure stability for the ruling 
elite. The success of the leader in maintaining support within the armed forces will determine 
the degree of stability of the regime. 
 
The aims of military actors in seizing power vary considerably between regimes. Seeking to 
categorise forms of military regimes, Nordlinger identified ruler, guardian and moderator 
types. Brooker (2000: 48) notes that these ‘were defined by a combination of two variables: 
(a) the extent of a regime’s political/economic objectives or goals, and (b) the extent of 
governmental power wielded by the military.’ Where these are both high (ruler type) the 
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military is likely to seek to maintain its hold on power. As an institution the military has an 
interest in maintaining a suitable flow of resources, but the professionalisation of armed 
forces has also led to the development of a broader sense of mission (Gandhi, 2008). This 
sense of mission can lead the military to challenge the authority of the ruling elite, seeking to 
take power itself to deal with perceived failings (Feaver, 1999; Sundhaussen, 1998). 
Considering military regimes, Linz and Stepan (1996) further argue that the more 
hierarchically led regimes will be more able to maintain themselves in power due to lower 
levels of internal factionalism. 
 
Although the armed forces as an institution control the political system under such regimes 
their organisational interests may lead to attempts to disguise or downplay their involvement. 
As Brooker (2000: 37) argues ‘military rule can take indirect and civilianised forms that are 
difficult to identify and/or to categorise.’ One way of making this shift is to establish a 
civilian political party to take over the running of the regime, as a precursor to 
democratisation or as a way of maintaining power. The decision to shed the uniform may also 
be an attempt to appear more palatable to voters and deal with manifestations of discontent 
(Gandhi, 2008). The underlying form of the regime does not necessarily change, as the leader 
with connections to the military retains an ability to call on those resources as required. 
However, it does introduce challenges for the civilianised leader who is required to establish 
a balance between the military and civilian bases of the regime, presenting further risks of 
instability and conflict (Brooker, 2000). 
 
Civilian regimes face different challenges to military regimes and as such are required to 
adopt strategies that are more suited to their context. Significantly, party regimes do not have 
an institutional organisation on which they can automatically rely. They are required 
therefore to create an organisation through which they can establish and maintain control 
(Gandhi, 2008). This need to adapt is an important aspect of one-party regimes, with Linz and 
Stepan (1996: 69) arguing that ‘civilian-led regimes…characteristically have greater 
institutional, symbolic, and absorptive capacities’. The capacity to adjust is driven by the 
need to build a base of support and deal with threats from opponents, through co-optation. 
While one-party regimes are clearly non-democratic Frantz and Stein (2012: 297) argue that 
such regimes ‘hold frequent elections and maintain legislatures to debate the policies (at least 
superficially).’ Elections and legislative bodies are mechanisms for generating legitimacy and 
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the appearance of support for the regime that can in turn strengthen the core institutional 
base. 
 
As with military regimes, one-party regimes vary considerably in their reasons for taking 
power. One factor common to many is the desire to maintain order in a situation of potential 
ethnic division, potentially privileging the status and interests of one group within society 
over others. Gandhi (2008: 31) notes that after gaining independence 60 percent of sub-
Saharan African states adopted a one-party model. In many of these cases the argument was 
made that the divided form of rule characteristic of democratic regimes was not culturally 
appropriate. This characterisation necessarily hides or obscures control by a dominant group 
within society. Samuel Huntington classified these regimes as exclusionary and that they 
could be ‘described as seeking to politically suppress or restrict the political activity of the 
politically subordinate section of its divided (bifurcated) society’ (Brooker, 2000: 41). By 
manipulating divisions within society the regime is therefore able to create insiders and 
outsiders, generating a form of regime legitimacy and reliance amongst the group that 
receives the benefit. 
 
There are similarities when comparing military and party regimes in their reliance on 
institutional forms as a basis for the exercise of control. However, the underlying source of 
authority and form of the governing institution clearly mark them out as facing distinct 
challenges. As noted above, military regimes rely on a formally constituted and organised 
institution that is guaranteed some form of continued existence regardless of the success or 
failure of the non-democratic regime. This awareness is clearly illustrated by the tendency to 
move towards civilianisation as the leader seeks to generate a distinct base that can provide 
greater freedom from the constraints of the military’s professional interests. This can lead to a 
tension arising between the desire of the military as institution to maintain its corporate form 
and that of the ruling elite to pursue political aims. The abuse of the military hierarchy can 
lead to internal tension and conflict as competing groups may seek to return to the barracks or 
seize control from the incumbent elites. 
 
Party regimes are less constrained by their institutional base, as the maintenance of power is 
collectively understood as central to continued viability. Although the party may have a 
corporate identity distinct from its role in governing this will likely be relatively weak and 
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fragment on losing power. In such a context the loss of power will result in higher costs for 
larger numbers of participants, as party elites and members may face prosecution and will 
almost certainly face a loss of status.
3
 Moving towards a multi-party competitive regime does 
provide an option for the dictatorial party to extract itself from power, but the lack of an 
established base of verifiable legitimacy means that such a move involves a significant 
degree of risk. In cases of ethnic, tribal or religious divisions within society the risk of losing 
power may be amplified as previously excluded groups may seek retribution (on ethnocracies 
see Attwell, 2015). Therefore, the desire of a party based authoritarian system to maintain 
power will likely be greater than that of a military regime. 
 
Leadership and Opportunity Structures 
The leader plays an important role in all forms of political regime. The specific nature of 
political leadership has been extensively examined and points to the great diversity in 
leadership styles and outcomes (Blondel, 1987; Burns, 1978; Elgie, 1995). Within this 
diversity Burns (1978: 433) has noted the centrality of the leader, arguing that ‘To define 
leadership in terms of motivation, value and purpose is to glimpse its central role in the 
processes of historical causation.’ Quite simply, the individual leader possess agency that can 
determine the direction of the political system and success or failure of the leader (O’Brien, 
2010). Although military and one-party regimes are characterised by their organisational 
form, the hierarchical character of their institutions grants a significant degree of power and 
influence to the leader. In order to determine the extent of this power it is important to 
consider the structural factors that can combine to constrain the actions of the leader. 
 
The structural factors that shape the actions of the leader can be divided into four broad 
categories: authority, institutions, opposition and continuity. Each of these four factors has a 
varying degree of influence on the leader and can provide support or threats depending on the 
context, making it important to consider them all individually. The authority of the leader 
refers to the origins of his/her power. As Cronin (1993: 13) has argued power is not a given 
and instead ‘is the strength or raw force to exercise power that is accepted as legitimate’. In 
non-democratic regimes the lack of ‘procedural legitimacy’ (Frantz and Stein, 2012: 295) 
means that other sources of support must be sought to justify the position of the regime. 
                                                          
3
 The case of de-Baathification in Iraq following the 2003 invasion provides an extreme example of this process 
(Pfiffner, 2010). 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Cambridge University Press in 
Government & Opposition on 26 January 2016, available online: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2015.41  
 
11 
 
Power needed to guarantee authority could accrue to the regime through its performance in 
restoring order and/or economic performance or to the leader through his/her personal 
charisma (Brooker, 2000). These forms of support are inherently fragile and subject to 
degradation over time as gains are normalised and expectations among the population rise. 
Where the power possessed by the regime is low the authority possessed by the leader and the 
ability to act is greatly restricted. 
 
Institutions play a role in determining the ability of the regime to maintain control over the 
political system and also the leader to accrue and exercise power. Elgie (1995: 203) has 
identified the importance of such institutions as playing ‘a fundamental part in structuring the 
nature of political competition’. As corporate bodies the military and party both have 
institutional hierarchies and rules of behaviour, providing the leader mechanisms for ordering 
power. Such institutions do not guarantee behaviour, with Blondel (1987, p. 8) arguing that 
‘legal and constitutional arrangements are often…unable to ensure that the scope of the 
intervention of leaders is effectively determined’. Where these institutions are weak or poorly 
managed their effectiveness is greatly reduced. While formal institutions can generate some 
form of certainty for the leader, they also possess within them mechanisms for constraining 
the actions of the leader. The interests of the corporate body (military or party) will outweigh 
that of the individual leader, so strengthening formal institutions may give the leader greater 
power and increase the associated accountability mechanisms. 
 
Opposition to the non-democratic regime presents both opportunities and threats. Where the 
opposition emerges from within society the regime can be strengthened, providing it with 
justification for being in power by maintaining order against disruptive forces within society. 
The exclusionary nature of military and one-party regimes means that where such opposition 
does emerge it is easier to portray the claimants as the other. By contrast, opposition that 
emerges from within the regime or its chosen constituency presents a far greater threat to the 
ability of the leader to exercise power.
4
 As noted above, leaders of military regimes must 
remove or pacify potential opponents within the regime, which can lead to resentment and the 
growth of internal opposition (Gandhi, 2008). Faced with internal challenges the leader must 
                                                          
4
 This internal pressure may be enhanced during times of external discontent where the regime is seen as having 
lost its legitimacy and be in need of change. On the case of Ben Ali in Tunisia see O’Brien, 2014. 
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devote resources to quelling such opposition and potentially shoring up support among allies 
(potential and actual). 
 
The final factor that determines the relative strength of the leader and ability to operate is the 
degree of continuity. When the regime is established, the patterns of behaviour of the actors 
are also settled, providing a greater degree of certainty and stability. The accretion of custom 
and previous practice is also important in establishing boundaries that determine the limits of 
possible leadership actions (Blondel, 1987). Hite and Morlino (2004) note that the longer a 
non-democratic regime is in power the more effectively it is able to mould the institutional 
structures and societal order to suit its purposes, embedding values, institutions and 
behaviours. In such a situation the leader is able to exercise a greater degree of agency, as the 
other actors are aware of the nature of the system and their role in it. At the same time, too 
much stability can lead for pressure for change from excluded groups (internal and external) 
where feelings of injustice pervade.  
 
Leader Characteristics of Roh Tae Woo and F.W. de Klerk 
This section considers the leadership of Roh Tae Woo (South Korea) and F.W. de Klerk 
(South Africa). Both leaders assumed positions of leadership following the inability of their 
predecessors to continue in power: President Chun was faced with increasingly robust public 
protests and P.W. Botha was partially incapacitated by a stroke. Emerging from within the 
apparatus of the state provided them with opportunities to recognise the need for change and 
make the decisions to facilitate it (on the similar case of Adolfo Suárez see O’Brien, 2007). 
Their ability to reform the respective systems and control the process was shaped by the 
environment, acting as a limiting factor on their exercise of agency. The remainder of this 
section outlines the key features of the leadership of Roh Tae Woo and F.W. de Klerk in 
relation to the framework outlined in the previous section, encompassing authority, 
institutions, opposition, and continuity.  
 
The cases have also been selected to allow consideration of military and party-type non-
democratic regimes. Both experienced extended periods of non-democratic rule, with 
individual rights being constrained and repression used against opponents of the regime. 
However, they did not reach the level of control observed in the totalitarian communist 
regimes and were more institutionalised than the personalist regimes that proliferated 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Cambridge University Press in 
Government & Opposition on 26 January 2016, available online: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2015.41  
 
13 
 
throughout much of Africa. Given the emergence of competitive authoritarian regimes in 
various forms (see Levitsky and Way, 2010), the apparent success of the two regimes in 
democratising may point to lessons that can be learned and potentially applied in the 
contemporary context. The generalisability is also improved by the attempt to identify 
features common to different regime types. Although each regime exists in its own context 
with distinct institutional pattern it is argued that it is possible to discern certain general 
pressures on leaders in shaping their opportunities and the decisions that result. 
 
The authority of Roh and de Klerk was assured in the formal sense by their respective 
positions as elected president. Similarities between the ways in which they came to power 
emerge in the fact that the position of their predecessors had become untenable. Faced with 
growing protests nationwide during 1986-87 and an unwillingness to negotiate a settlement, 
President Chun Doo Hwan was forced to announce his retirement in June 1987, anointing 
Roh Tae Woo as successor (Bedeski, 1994). Roh sought to establish his legitimacy by 
announcing an eight-point plan for reform on 29 June (Saxer, 2003). A key part of the reform 
programme was the promise to hold presidential elections in December 1987 under new 
rules. The divided nature of the opposition meant that Roh was able to secure victory in these 
elections and a five-year term in office (Bedeski, 1994). While Roh had been successful, his 
ties to the preceding Chun regime limited his longer-term appeal in the eyes of the population 
(Moon and Rhyu, 2011). 
 
In South Africa, F.W. de Klerk assumed the position of leader of the ruling National Party 
and President in 1989. The incumbent president, P.W. Botha, suffered a stroke in January 
1989 that left him partially incapacitated, precipitating his resignation in August (Sisk, 1995). 
Botha’s resignation followed attempts by de Klerk (as National Party leader) to begin to 
liberalise the regime. While de Klerk was elected president in September 1989, he recognised 
the need for change, as Sisk (1995: 81) argues: 
if he wanted to prevent further erosion of support on both the left and the right, he could no 
longer ride the horns of the reformer’s dilemma, as Botha had. A clear departure from the 
policies of the past – one way or another – was needed. 
Possessing a mandate as elected president (albeit of a ‘racial oligarchy’ (Friedman, 1998: 59)) 
de Klerk initiated a series of reforms (announced in a February 1990 speech) to open the way 
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for the deconstruction of the Apartheid system. This path was further reinforced by the 
referendum in support of the reform agenda in March 1992 (Kersting, 2010). 
 
The key difference between the political systems in South Africa and South Korea was in the 
form of the dominant institution, party and military respectively. As noted above, the form of 
institution that underpins the political system is significant in determining the ability of the 
leader to act and also placing constraints on the nature of those actions. In South Korea, the 
military dominated politics for much of the period following formation of the Republic after 
WWII. While the military was nominally in charge, it has been argued that the rise to 
dominance of an internal faction (Hanahoe) led by Chun challenged the institutional mission 
and weakened the professionalism (Kim, 2013; Moon and Rhyu, 2011). The result was that 
when Roh Tae Woo came to power, there was a desire within the military as an institution to 
leave politics (Cotton, 1989). Illustrating this point, Saxer (2003: 48) argues that: 
for the most part there was a realisation that military suppression would lead to significant 
casualties and adverse international repercussions, and that there was desire by the military to 
extract itself from the political morass and concentrate on a purely professional mission. 
In such an environment, Roh (as a key member of the Hanahoe) faction was forced to 
introduce reforms to the political system in an attempt to cultivate a new institutional base. 
 
The situation in South Africa was similar in some ways, but the dominance of the National 
Party meant that withdrawal from power was not as clear-cut. Coming to power in 1948, the 
National Party had dominated the political system and constructed the elaborate race-based 
state under the banner of Apartheid (Sisk, 1995). Although the South African regime was not 
formally a one-party regime, the dominance of the National Party meant that it effectively 
operated as such. Outlining the idea of one-party domination, Giliomee and Simkins (1999: 
2) note that: 
political survival is to a large degree due to the fact that even prior to the founding election 
they had staked a strong claim to represent the new nation (or regime of dominant 
racial/ethnic group) with its particular historical project, and had managed to occupy a 
strategic position of power. 
Under the P.W. Botha a new constitution was introduced in 1983 that created the office of 
State President and concentrated more power in the hands of the executive (Sisk, 1995). 
Botha was clearly a reformist leader, recognising the need for change in the system, but not 
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wanting to move away from the ideology and institutions that characterised the regime (see 
Giliomee, 2013). In consolidating power it can be argued that he was attempting to stabilise 
the system by giving himself the power to take more timely action. Substantial increases in 
protest from the mid-1980s placed increasing pressure on the state and led to a reliance on the 
security forces. On coming to power F.W. de Klerk sought to move away from the 
presidential dominance and introduce a more cabinet-based political system (Geldenhuys and 
Kotze, 1991). Within the National Party there were growing tensions between verligte 
(liberalisers) and verkrampte (conservatives) around the need for reform (Sisk, 1995). Siding 
with the verligte side de Klerk recognised the need to generate legitimacy for the National 
Party to increase the likelihood that it could continue as a viable force in the post-Apartheid 
political environment. 
 
Emerging from within the military to assume the position of president, Roh Tae Woo faced 
significant opposition from those seeking more radical change. As noted above, widespread 
popular protest influenced his decision to initiate reform. While this protest subsided 
somewhat after his election, he continued to face opposition from the legislative branch. In 
particular, the opposition parties that had won a majority in the National Assembly elections 
of April 1988 continued to press for change (Bedeski, 1994). This was significant, as Saxer 
(2003: 60) argues ‘Losing the National Assembly majority severely limited the ability of the 
Roh government to push through laws without compromising with the opposition.’ To 
overcome the challenge of an oppositional legislative branch, the former ruling Democratic 
Justice Party (DJP) merged with two opposition parties to form the Democratic Liberal Party 
(Bedeski, 1994: 39). This merger provided the government with a degree of ‘authority – but 
without authoritarianism’ (Bedeski, 1994: 40), which was reflected by a ‘reduced willingness 
of the ruling party to compromise on reforms of the economic and political system’ (Saxer, 
2003: 60). At the same time, Roh faced limited opposition from the military, as following the 
split between reformers and hardliners in 1987 those marginalised by the regime were unable 
to present a unified challenge (Croissant, 2004; Kim, 2013). 
 
F.W. de Klerk faced a more robust opposition inside and outside the formal institutions of the 
state. The decision of Botha and, more forcefully, de Klerk to move away from the 
foundations of the apartheid system created opposition in the form of the verkrampte 
Conservative Party, which emerged in the 1987 elections (Sisk, 1995). This group criticised 
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the de Klerk government as illegitimate, due to its failure to represent its traditional 
constituency (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1991; Kersting, 2010). Outside the formal system, the 
African National Congress (ANC) had been involved in staging substantial opposition under 
Botha and de Klerk. To deal with this threat and encourage de-escalation of violence de Klerk 
unbanned the ANC in February 1990 and extended negotiations that had been initiated by 
Botha (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1991). The police and security forces (securocrats) 
complicated this relationship by working to undermine his credibility with the ANC and its 
leader, Nelson Mandela (Glad and Blanton, 1997). Faced with this broad range of opposition 
de Klerk was required to strike a careful balance, leading Glad and Blanton (1997: 577) to 
argue: 
when undertaking the journey to end apartheid, he took care to bring the NP along with him. 
Indeed, even his hesitation in curbing the securocrats in his own government may have been 
politically necessary. 
Opposition to de Klerk’s government was an important structural constraint on his ability to 
reform the system, yet he was able to exercise agency due to his position between hardline 
factions on either side of the argument. 
 
The decision of Roh Tae Woo to liberalise and democratise the regime was driven by 
pressure from below as well as externally (see Ooi, 2013). However, his position was 
essential as he ‘represented an important symbol of continuity that bridged the transition from 
the old regime to the young democracy. (Croissant, 2004: 371; see also Moon and Rhyu, 
2011) This stability and continuity was significant as the ‘generals and coup-makers were 
often waiting in the wings’ (Bedeski, 1994: 6). While negotiations to reform the constitution 
prior to the 1987 elections had reduced the power of the president ‘politics in South Korea 
remained very much a zero-sum game’ with the executive the dominant actor (Saxer, 2003: 
56). Emerging from the non-democratic regime both sides sought gains that would strengthen 
them for the future rather than what was best for the state (Saxer, 2003). In acting as a bridge 
Roh possessed substantial agency, while the regime appeared to be on a path to democracy 
that could not be reversed he was in a position to weigh the demands of both sides and use 
these to stabilise the process of change. 
 
Continuity was also important in maintaining the stability of the political system in South 
Africa in the face of multiple competing demands. As State President, de Klerk reined in the 
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powers of the office and expanded negotiation with the ANC (Sisk, 1995; Geldenhuys and 
Kotze, 1991). However, he was careful not to alienate his support base by continued ‘refusal 
to ever state publicly that apartheid had been morally wrong’ (Glad and Blanton, 1997: 572). 
The ability of de Klerk to steer the middle ground was supported by a previous ‘lack of direct 
exposure to two of the most contentious areas of Nationalist policy [race relations and 
security]’ (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1991: 37). These characteristics meant that while de Klerk 
was clearly identified with the outgoing apartheid regime and continued to identify as such, 
he could also be seen as representing the more palatable side of the system. The final way in 
which de Klerk demonstrated continuity was his 1992 referendum on the reform programme, 
as this ensured that supporters of the NP backed the reform and dissolution of the existing 
system (Kersting, 2010).
5
 As with Roh Tae Woo, de Klerk was able to strike a careful 
balance between conservatives and reformers, using his agency to maintain a pace of change 
that prevented extremes emerging on either side. 
 
Ultimately, the loss of power by the National Party following the transition to democracy was 
apparent to those in power, as there was significant opposition to regime within society. De 
Klerk’s decision to liberalise and move towards an open democratic system was based on the 
idea that something could be salvaged and the National Party may still have a role to play in 
the new system. In contrast, the South Korean regime had a relatively unified base that would 
continue to possess some degree of institutional influence regardless of the outcome. In 
seeking to legitimise the regime and maintain its hold on power the military in South Korea 
should be viewed as a corporate body that saw its rule as best for society, guaranteeing 
stability and certainty. The growing opposition and costs associated with repression 
convinced those in power that it would be necessary to move towards some form of 
democracy, while still seeking to maintain some degree of control. In both cases the external 
pressures on the regime required that action be taken to release the pressure that had been 
building or move towards a more extensive form of control and repression. 
 
Considering the Outcomes and Significance of the Framework 
Despite emerging from very different cultural origins and regime types, the two cases 
followed similar trajectories in opening up their political systems and moving towards 
                                                          
5
 There is a parallel with Suárez’s ability to encourage Los Cortes Generales to support reform that saw many of 
its members lose their positions (O’Brien, 2007). 
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democracy. In each case the leader assumed power following a disruptive event and turned 
from their past record of participation to initiate change. This section examines the 
comparison between the two leaders, utilising the framework outlined above and also asking 
to what extent the form of non-democratic regime affected their ability to act. The differences 
in regime type outlined above would suggest that the South Korean regime would be more 
able to relinquish power as the military would retain its position, whereas the South African 
regime would face a more uncertain future. The distribution of structural factors considered 
in the previous section is summarised in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
 
There is a high degree of similarity between the two cases in the position of the de Klerk and 
Roh. Both leaders emerged from within the political system and used it to achieve a smooth 
transition to democracy when it became apparent this was the only viable option, thereby 
preventing the need for a dramatic rupture that may have led to instability (see O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, 1986). This was a distinct possibility in both cases given widespread societal 
opposition and pressure for change at the time of Roh and de Klerk assumed power (see 
Bedeski, 1994; Sisk, 1995). The nature of their accession to power is important in grounding 
their authority. Inheriting office gave them some legitimacy within the ruling institutions 
(military and party) that they were able to use when seeking to reform the system. At the 
same time, subjecting themselves to a vote (under a partially reformed system in South 
Korea) granted a degree of legitimacy from the wider population. Establishing a base of 
authority in this way enabled them to temporarily occupy a position between the prior regime 
and the emerging democratic system. 
 
The institutions that brought the leaders to power represent an apparent divergence between 
the cases. As noted above, military and one-party systems operate according to different 
logics. Despite this, the presence of a core institution running the state provides a basis for 
comparison, specifically the desire to maintain organisational integrity and cohesion. In 
Roh’s case the military was looking to extricate itself from power in the face of growing 
external opposition and internal factionalisation, providing an opportunity for him to act. 
While in South Africa, the declining fortunes of the NP presaged a more polarized future 
political landscape and encouraged de Klerk to move towards a true multi-party system from 
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a position of relative but declining strength. The desire to maintain a position of control over 
the direction of the regime in the changing environment was a common characteristic, leading 
both leaders to announce more substantial programmes of reform (Kersting, 2010; Saxer, 
2003). 
 
Opposition to the non-democratic regime was important in providing the impetus for change. 
However, opposition did not cease with the announcement of reforms. South Korea saw 
opposition take a more organised form with the emergence of the various parliamentary 
parties, forcing further accommodations after the 1988 elections. A similar pattern occurred 
in South Africa, although external non-parliamentary opposition persisted at a high level of 
intensity. One area where the two cases diverged was in the degree of internal opposition, as 
de Klerk faced a significant threat from hardline (verkrampte) actors within the state 
bureaucracy, requiring a more cautious approach to reform of the system. This difference 
results from the more established hierarchical ordering that characterises a military regime, 
where the hierarchy and associated obligations may persist following the regime change. 
Opposition was an important factor for both leaders, as it constrained their options and 
encouraged continuation along the chosen path towards liberalisation (see Guo and 
Stradiotto, 2014). 
 
Underpinning all of these factors is the issue of continuity. The presence of Roh and de Klerk 
ensured that there was a degree of stability that allowed reform to the system to take place. A 
second component in relation to continuity was the ability of the new leaders to see reforms 
to the constitutional structure through to completion. In each case there was a need to reform 
the constitution to reduce the influence of the military (South Korea) and allow full 
participation of excluded groups (South Africa). Acting as figureheads, Roh and de Klerk 
negotiated the reforms, steering a course between external demands for reform and internal 
pressures to maintain the existing order (much stronger in the case of South Africa). While it 
is possible that emergent challengers from outside the core elite could have carried out reform 
of the system, the risk of instability resulting from elite dissatisfaction would have been 
greater. 
 
Reading across the four structural factors in light of the experiences of de Klerk and Roh it 
would appear that continuity was the most important. The presence of an actor with 
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connections to the non-democratic regime generated some degree of stability during a period 
of uncertainty. The ability of both leaders to manage their respective institutions and draw on 
the authority granted them ensured that there was no collapse or requirement for an interim 
government (as identified by Linz and Stepan (1996)). Their continued presence also 
provided an opportunity for opposition to coalesce and work together to present a more 
unified front, so that when the system was fully opened in the form of competitive elections 
that displaced the incumbent leaders the support base of those coming to power was 
sufficiently institutionalised. The fact that the non-democratic regimes had been in power for 
an extended period of time meant that opposition was necessarily weak and fragmented at the 
beginning of the liberalisation phase, reinforcing the importance of time to allow civil society 
actors to emerge and consolidate their position.  
 
Conclusion 
The role of the leader during a period of democratisation is a central factor in shaping the 
outcome. During the instability surrounding the break with the past this entails, an effective 
leader can contribute to stabilisation of social and political challenges. This paper has 
examined the leadership of F.W. de Klerk (South Africa) and Roh Tae Woo (South Korea) 
and their respective decisions to introduce changes leading to democratisation. To assess the 
structural factors that enabled de Klerk and Roh to act the way they did a basic framework 
was introduced. This examined the significance of four factors: authority, institutions, 
opposition, and continuity. These factors captured the formal power possessed by the leader 
as well as the broader context within which he operated. Despite the differences that 
characterise military and one-party regimes it became apparent that in all four areas the 
leaders faced broadly similar structural constraints and enabling factors, possibly pointing to 
the similarities in the eventual outcome observed. Agency still played a role in determining 
how they chose to engage with the context, but this was shaped very clearly by the structure 
(see also O’Brien, 2007). At different points in the liberalisation of their regimes the leaders 
were faced with decisions on whether to continue with the liberalisation or roll back some of 
the gains. In these cases de Klerk and Roh worked towards a greater degree of openness, 
albeit at a pace that was permissible within the structural context. The pressures faced by the 
respective leaders also meant that decisions that reversed earlier steps may have provided an 
opening for internal opponents to gain control or justification for external societal actors to 
intensify their claims. 
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Despite operating in different institutional environments (one-party versus military) F.W. de 
Klerk and Roh Tae Woo followed similar trajectories in their decision-making. As regime 
insiders they were connected to the existing regime and in that way constrained in the extent 
to which they were able to consider radical change. The findings of the paper suggest that the 
role of the individual leader is significant in initiating and overseeing the democratisation 
process, particularly in providing an element of continuity. Taking on leadership roles they 
were in positions to alter the system in a manner that was less constrained than that of their 
predecessors, as there was a recognised need for change and they possessed a degree of 
distance that made this possible. The political systems de Klerk and Roh presided over  
provided an institutional base from which they were able to operate, contributing in some 
ways to the stability. At the same time, the leaders possessed sufficient agency to successfully 
support the decision to liberalise and eventually move the political system towards 
democracy.  
 
In order to develop and examine the significance of the basic framework further analysis 
considering less successful regime changes is warranted. The paper has considered two cases 
where individual leaders who chose to introduce reforms to deal with pressure for change, 
leading to a need to consider cases where leaders chose instead to hold on. Events in the Arab 
Spring suggest that if a leader is unable or unwilling to relinquish power they may be forced 
out, as in Tunisia and Egypt. Alternately, if there is a perception of threat to the dominant 
elite, as in Syria, they may be able to withstand and bear the costs of containing the pressure 
for change. The analysis here has focused on the ability of the new leader to introduce change 
within the institutional structure, but there is a need to broaden the analysis to consider the 
ability of long-standing leaders to change direction and initiate change. The proliferation of 
competitive authoritarian regimes makes the need to consider the factors that facilitate or 
inhibit the decision to introduce change increasingly important, as liberalisation can serve as 
cover for meaningful change and facilitate the perpetuation of authoritarian control. Finally, 
the extended lengths of time that both non-democratic regimes considered in the paper were 
in power points to the need to consider the role of leadership in less institutionalised and 
entrenched political systems. 
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Table 1 – Comparison of Leaders 
  Leader 
  Roh Tae Woo F.W. de Klerk 
 Authority ‘Inherited’ (Chun) ‘Inherited’ (Botha) 
  Elected Elected 
Structural 
Factors 
Institutions Military Party 
Opposition External (parliamentary) Internal (verkrampte) 
  External (parliamentary, 
ANC) 
 Continuity Elected President Elected President 
  Negotiated Constitutional 
Reform 
Negotiated Constitutional 
Reform 
 
